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RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE CANADIAN




On April 24, 1985, Bill C-18, The Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1985,1 was passed into law by the House of Commons of Can-
ada. The Act amended the Criminal Code2 by introducing, among
other things, specific sections relating to computer abuse offenses.
As a result, Canadian Law enforcement agencies can now lay
charges for criminal activities involving computers which had been
conspicuously missing from the Criminal Code. United States com-
panies doing business in Canada can now rely on the Criminal Code
to deter those in Canada who would invade their computer systems
or destroy or alter data stored in their computers.
In order to understand the full significance of the recent
amendments to the Criminal Code, in addition to analyzing the new
sections, one must examine the circumstances which have led to
such changes. Also, recent case law and current proposals for other
laws which incorporate penal sections for offenses involving com-
puters should be examined.
This paper will examine the new language of the Criminal
Code for computer related offenses and will discuss some of the defi-
nitional problems which are unavoidable when dealing with such
matters. Relevant cases will also be reviewed in order to fully com-
prehend their present and future effect on this area of the law. Un-
like the United States where most criminal laws are within the
jurisdiction of each state, Canadian criminal matters are under the
Copyright © Chris Webber 1987. All Rights Reserved.
* Portions of this paper were presented as a speech to the Computer Law Update
Conference, Canadian Bar Association (Ontario Division), Toronto, November 1985.
Additions have been made and footnotes added.
** Assistant Corporate Counsel, Amdahl Canada Limited. This paper does not neces-
sarily reflect the views of Amdahl Canada Limited.
1. Bill C-18, The Criminal Law Amendment Act, Ist Session, 33rd Parliament, 33-34
Eliz. 2, 1984-85 (1985).
2. CAN. REv. STAT. 1970, Ch. C-34 (1970).
COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGYLA W JOURNAL
exclusive authority of the federal government.3 To better under-
stand the similarities and differences between Canadian computer-
related criminal laws and United States legislation, the new provi-
sions of the Canadian Criminal Code will be compared with the
corresponding sections of the California Penal Code, which is one
of the leading jurisdictions in the United States regarding computer
offense statutes.
The new provisions in the Criminal Code and the correspond-
ing cases relating to computer abuses and misappropriation of pro-
prietary information will act as the foundation for future Canadian
legislative changes. It is of utmost importance that such laws are
built upon a sound conceptual base.
II. THE INSPIRATION FOR CHANGE: R. V. MCLAUGHLIN
The relevant sections of the amended Criminal Code are Sec-
tions 301.2 and 387(1.1), both of which were passed in response to
the issues raised by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of R.
v. McLaughlin.4
McLaughlin was convicted at trial on a charge that he "fraud-
ulently, and without colour of right, used a telecommunication fa-
cility, the property of the University of Alberta, contrary to Section
287(1)(b) ... of the Criminal Code."' McLaughlin was a Univer-
sity of Alberta student who had gained access to certain computer
security codes which enabled him to obtain the identity and secret
passwords of other users. When apprehended by the police, he ad-
mitted that he had examined the computer files of public users and
had made changes in the billings of other accounts.
The Alberta Court of Appeal permitted his appeal and the con-
viction was quashed.6 In 1980, that decision was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
appropriation of the programs (and other information) involved use
of a telecommunication facility, as referred to in Section 287(1)(b),
and as defined in Section 287(2) of the Criminal Code. Section 287
states:
287. (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently, mali-
ciously, or without colour of right,
3. Constitution Act 1982 § 91(27) (1984) (jurisdiction for criminal law designated to
the federal government).
4. 113 D.L.R.3d 386, 53 C.C.C.2d 417, 18 C.R.3d 339 (1980).
5. 113 D.L.R.3d at 386 (1980).
6. 12 C.R.3d 391, 51 C.C.C.2d 243 (1979).
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(a) abstracts, consumes or uses electricity or gas or causes
it to be wasted or diverted, or
(b) uses any telecommunication facility or obtains any tel-
ecommunication service 1974-75-76, c.93, s.23(l).
(2) In this section and in section 287.1, "telecommunica-
tion" means any transmission, emission or reception of signs, sig-
nals, writing, images, sounds or intelligence of any nature by
radio, visual, electronic or other electromagnetic system. 1960-
61, c.43, s.6; 1974-75-76, c.93, s.23(2).
Chief Justice Laskin, in his decision for the majority of the Supreme
Court, found that a computer system may be termed a facility.
However, he reasoned that its function was not transmission as re-
quired under section 287(2). According to Laskin:
[T]he function of the computer is not the channeling of informa-
tion to outside recipients so as to be susceptible in that respect to
unauthorized use. Rather, it is to permit the making of complex
calculations, to process and correlate information and to store it,
and to enable it to be retrieved. The distinction I would draw is
admittedly, narrow. However, I do not think that using a termi-
nal, as did the accused . . . brings such use within
§ 287(l)(b)... [T]he fact that the accused, by using the terminal,
was able to make electronic connection with the central process-
ing unit to capture information that was stored there does not
advance the case against him.7
In reaching its decision, the court did not have to address the
issue of whether the information appropriated constituted an of-
fense against rights of property as defined in Part VII of the Crimi-
nal Code under the general provisions for Theft. Specifically, in
Part VII, Section 283(1) establishes that the object of a theft is
"anything whether animate or inanimate."
As Linda Whan pointed out in her case comment Computer
Crime and R. v. McLaughlin: "This issue arises out of the fact that
data on a computer printout or tape is an intangible."' The funda-
mental problem involves ascertaining whether there are proprietary
rights attachable to such intangibles as computer programs or data
stored in computers. The Supreme Court of Canada concluded in
McLaughlin that the Criminal Code ought to specifically relate to
unauthorized access to computer facilities before the courts should
convict an individual for such conduct.9
The impact of the McLaughlin case was not taken lightly by
7. Supra note 4, 113 D.L.R.3d, at 390 (1980).
8. 18 C.R.3d 350, 358 (1981).
9. See the judgment of Estey J. in McLaughlin, supra note 4, 113 D.L.R.3d, at 394,
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those concerned with computer abuse. Shortly after the decision
was handed down, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) sent a tele-
gram to the then Justice Minister Jean Chretien and all Attorneys-
General and Territorial Legal Officers requesting that immediate
steps be taken to resolve the problem. Cosigning the telegram were
the Canadian Information Processing Society (CIPS) and the Cana-
dian Law Information Council (CLIC), two of the more prominent
institutions representing the electronic data processing profession.10
At that time Gordon Henderson, President of the CBA, called
for an immediate revision of the Criminal Code to define a com-
puter as a telecommunication device. However, Silas Halyk, Cana-
dian Law Information Council's Chairman, and Gaylen Duncan, an
associated computer law expert and editor of the CIPS Review,
both voiced the need for a more tempered approach. Both recom-
mended in-depth studies of the implications and consequences of
the McLaughlin case.
Around the time of McLaughlin, another computer-abuse inci-
dent received a great deal of media attention and again illustrated
the need for effective revisions to curb computer abuses. In April of
1980, youthful pranksters in the exclusive Dalton private school in
Manhattan used the school's terminal to attempt to penetrate and
vandalize twenty-one Canadian computer systems. The Royal Ca-
nadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) and Bell Canada investigated a complaint from a
Montreal cement company which detected unauthorized attempts
to access their system. The youths had found a link between Bell
Canada's Datapac and GTE Telenet Communications Corporation
of Vienna, Virginia through which they were able to tap into sys-
tems owned by Bell Canada, Honeywell Ltd., Concordia Univer-
sity, the universities of Waterloo and Alberta, and others.
Some of the owners involved in the investigation were com-
pletely unaware that their computer had been accessed, while in
other situations the youths had destroyed information when the sys-
tem's monitors and security had not allowed them access."1 This
"computer caper" further accentuated the need to prevent and de-
ter such activities.
Over the past ten years, law enforcement agencies have exerted
where he defers to Parliament to enact specific provisions for unauthorized operation of a
computer.
10. The contents of the telegram were published in The National, Sept., 1980 and CIPS
Review, Sept., 1980.




commendable efforts to keep abreast of the issues. The RCMP cre-
ated an Electronic Data Processing (EDP) Security Section in the
Security Systems Branch in Ottawa. The section has developed
training courses in computer crime and has trained squads of spe-
cialists who have been posted in various divisions throughout the
country.' 2 The Provincial Police have also responded by creating
special "fraud squads" to combat criminals using computers.
The police were convinced that crimes perpetrated by the use
of computers were far more prevalent than statistics indicated. Law
enforcement agencies were in a frustrating situation; special forces
had been devised to investigate and apprehend computer criminals,
but the courts refused to convict them under the Criminal Code.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEW AMENDMENTS
The new amendments represent the culmination of a number
of attempts to draft computer-related offenses for inclusion in the
Criminal Code. In February, 1981 Bill C-628 went to First Read-
ing in the Canadian House of Commons. 3 The Bill was introduced
by Mr. Taylor, Member of Parliament, and was intended to provide
amendments to the Criminal Code regarding computer-related
crimes. That Bill redefined property in Section 2 of the Criminal
Code to include "financial instruments, information, electronically
produced data, computer software and programs in either machine
or human readable form, and any other tangible or intangible item
of value."' 4 In Section 283, the definition of "anything" was to be
changed to incorporate all of the above mentioned intangibles.15
Bill C-628 met with a great deal of resistance and was ultimately
defeated, in part, due to its inherent definitional problems.
Bill C-66716 was the successor to Bill C-628. It was introduced
by another Member of Parliament, Mr. Perrin Beatty, and was
given First Reading in Parliament on December 16, 1982. Like its
predecessor, C-667 attempted to grapple with the definitional
problems concerning computer-related crime. To this end the defi-
nition of computer was revised to mean: ". . . any programmable
device or apparatus designed to store processed data or information,
but does not include a hand-held calculator or similar device."'
17
12. See, Barrett, Police Taking Special Courses, Vancouver Sun, Sept. 10, 1980, at 1.
13. Bill C-628, Ist Sess., 32nd Legisl., Eliz. 2, 1980-81 (1981).
14. Id. § 1; see also commentary in clause 1 of explanatory notes.
15. Id.
16. Bill C-667, 1st Sess., 32nd Legisl., Eliz. 2, 1980-81-82 (1982).
17. Id., at CI. 1.
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Both of the above mentioned Bills exemplify the inherent
problems faced by legislators when drafting laws which propose to
regulate the use of computers. Inevitably, the technology will
render the legislation antiquated.
Bill C-667 was ultimately withdrawn from Second Reading on
February 9, 1983 and its subject-matter was referred to the Stand-
ing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs for further study. The
committee subsequently published a report in June, 198318 which
led to the creation of the Criminal Law Reform Act, 1984 (Bill C-
19). Due to the federal election in 1984 and the ultimate change in
government, Bill C-19 was not enacted.
IV. PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
The foregoing brief overview has been provided to demonstrate
the amount of effort expended in attempting to define such terms as
computer, programming, data and other computer-related termi-
nology. United States legislative draftsmen have experienced simi-
lar difficulties when trying to define computer terminology. United
States Senate Bill S.240 - Federal Computer Systems Protection Act
of 197919 came under considerable criticism for its uncertainty and
all-encompassing character.20
The task, as outlined by John K. Taber, is that of excluding:
"...trivia like calculators at one end of the scale, and the telephone
system, which is the largest special purpose computer ever built, at
the other. The purpose of such an exercise is to limit the definition
of computer to a general purpose digital computer used for record
keeping."'21  The failure to make such a distinction, says Taber,
threatens to make criminals out of the large number of members in
the EDP professions.22
Subsequent to the criticism received by Bill S.240, another Bill,
H.R.3970, was introduced in 1981.23 This new legislation at-
tempted to plug the apparent gaps in Bill S.240. The broad-sweep-
ing definition of computer was somewhat restricted in the new Bill
by excluding: ". . . an automated typewriter or typesetter, or any
18. Report of the Subcommittee on Computer Crime to the Standing Committee on Jus-
tice and LegalAffairs, The House of Commons of Canada, 1st Sess., 32 Legisl., Eliz. 2, 1980-
81-82-83 (1983).
19. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
20. See Taber, On Computer Crime (Senate Bill S.240), 1 COMPUTER L.J. 517 to 537
(1978-79).
21. Id. at 532, n. 88.
22. See Taber, supra note 20, at 530.
23. H.R. 3970, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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computer designed and manufactured for, and which is used exclu-
sively for routine personal, family, or household purposes including
a portable hand-held electronic calculator. '2 4 The new draft elimi-
nated some of the possibly absurd results of a broad definition but
still did not exculpate over-zealous students who print Snoopy cal-
endars or playful programmers who play computer tick-tac-toe.
In Canada, the amendments have been drafted to be broad
enough to encompass future computer technology. Under the re-
cent Act, the definition of electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or
other device reads as follows: "electromagnetic, acoustic, mechani-
cal or other device means any device or apparatus that is used or is
capable of being used to intercept any function of a computer sys-
tem, but does not include a hearing aid used to correct subnormal
hearing of the user to not better than normal hearing. 25
In addition, the definition of computer system has been broad-
ened from previous versions. Recall that in Bill C-667, the term
computer was defined to exclude ". . . hand-held calculator or simi-
lar device."' 26 The definition of computer system in the amend-
ments does not include such an exclusion for pocket calculators.
Presumably, the draftsmen were concerned with the possible evolu-
tion of pocket calculator technology. It is conceivable that future
designs for pocket calculators could incorporate remote computer
accessing capabilities which would then bring such a device under
the definition of computer system.
Donald Piragoff, 7 in his paper Computers,28 has commented:
In designing sanctions for the unauthorized use of a computer
system, a major concern must be whether Canadian society
wishes to criminalize the mere unauthorized use of a computer.
A dilemma, therefore, rises in attempting to legislate in this area.
If the legislation is too specific it may be technologically or func-
tionally limited in the type of computers it protects. If the legis-
lation is too general, it may penalize any unauthorized use of a
computer system, or punish persons who honestly thought they
had authority to use that system.z9
Now, any person who wilfully presses the cancel button on
anyone else's pocket calculator, microwave oven, video cassette re-
24. Id.
25. Bill C-18, supra note 1, Cl. 46.
26. Bill C-667, supra note 17.
27. Counsel for the Criminal Law Policy and Amendments Section of the Department
of Justice in Canada.
28. Piragoff, Computers, 16 OTrAWA L. REV. 306 (1984).
29. Id. at 313.
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corder or any other product containing microchip technology could
be subject to the criminal sanctions as set out in Section 387(1.1) of
the Criminal Code relating to mischief.30 This absurd result illus-
trates the definitional difficulties which plague these new sections.
It will be left to the Courts to develop reasonable definitional
parameters.
V. RELEVANT CASE LAW
To date, the most controversial judicial decision involving the
misappropriation of proprietary information is found in the case of
R. v. Stewart.3
Stewart was charged with counseling to commit mischief,
fraud and theft relating to a list of 600 employees of a large hotel
complex. The data included names, addresses and telephone num-
bers which were contained in personal files and were also stored in
the payroll file of the hotel's computer.
The accused, acting as an agent for a trade union seeking bar-
gaining-unit status, approached a security person at the hotel and
offered to pay him for surreptitiously copying the confidential
information.
In a dissenting opinion, Lacourciere J.A. addressed the issue of
whether confidential information could be the subject of theft. He
reasoned that it could not and concurred with the trial judge that:
".. . it is for Parliament to broaden the criminal definition of the
property concept if the needs of modem Canadian society require
it." 3 2
However, Houlden J.A. and Cory J.A., representing the major-
ity decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal, set
aside the verdict of acquittal and convicted Stewart of counseling to
commit theft. Of special significance is the reasoning of Cory J.A.
wherein he concluded that the unauthorized use of copyrighted
works of a confidential nature constitutes theft as defined in Section
283(1) of the Criminal Code.33 Confidential information can now
be stolen according to the Stewart decision.
Stewart has filed Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The decision in Stewart was a marked departure from previous
case law and will have a resounding impact on intellectual property
30. This section will be fully examined infra.
31. 149 D.L.R.3d 583, 5 C.C.C.3d 481, 35 C.R.3d 105, 42 O.R.2d 225 (1983).
32. 149 D.L.R.3d 583, 593 (1983).
33. 149 D.L.R.3d 583, 603 (1983).
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law and on criminal law if the Supreme Court of Canada upholds
the decision.
R. Grant Hammond, in his paper Quantum Physics,
Econometric Models and Property Rights to Information,34 states
that:
[T]he most striking characteristic of information is that it does
not fit easily into the extended concepts of property.
First, sole ownership is vastly complicated in the case of in-
formation. The act of theft is often impossible to detect and diffi-
cult to prove. A piece of information can be "owned" by two
people at the same time without any denial of conventional bene-
fits of ownership. 35
Hammond argues that what may be required is a conceptual
shift from viewing information as property to viewing it as a social
resource - comparable to the shift from Newtonian physics to
quantum mechanics.
In Stewart, the Ontario Court of Appeal made the quantum
leap alluded to in the Hammond article without any extensive re-
search or study into the implications of such a conceptual shift.
The Stewart case was followed in 1984 by Re Turner et alAnd
the Queen.36 There the Ontario High Court refused an application
to quash an order of the Provincial Court, Criminal Division, which
committed three co-accused to trial on charges of mischief pursuant
to Section 387, which is under Part IX of the Criminal Code, enti-
tled "Willful and Forbidden Acts in Respect of Certain Property."
The accused were alleged to have interfered with and to have
altered data stored on computer tapes. The court, relying in part on
Stewart, construed the definition of property to be the same for Sec-
tion 385 and Subsection 387(1), which describe the offense of mis-
chief, as the court in Stewart defined property for the purposes of
Subsection 283(1) relating to theft. In his case comment on R. v.
Turner,37 John Finlay criticized the judicial reasoning in Turner by
pointing out that:
"It should be noted in Section 385 that the definition of property
is specifically restricted to those offenses set out in Part IX of the
Criminal Code of which the offenses of theft and fraud are not
34. Hammond, Quantum Physics, Econometric Models and Property Rights to Informa-
tion, 27 McGILL L.J. 47 (1981).
35. Id. at 54 (1981).
36. 13 C.C.C.3d 430 (Ont. H.C.J.) (1984).
37. See Finaly, R. v. Turner, I CANADIAN COMPUTER LAW REPORTER 222 (Sept.
1984).
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contained. Therefore, the offense of mischief is different than
that of theft or fraud in that property is given a more restricted
meaning for purposes of the offense of mischief.," 8
If the decision in Turner is not reversed on appeal, then for
purposes of defining property under the Mischief Section of the
Criminal Code, the court may apply the definition of property set
out under Part VII relating to theft and fraud. It could be argued
that this analysis disregards the distinct definitions of property set
out under Part VII and Part IX of the Criminal Code and broadens
the scope of the Mischief Section to include activities to which his-
torically the Criminal Code has not applied.
Although the intention of both the Stewart and the Turner
courts may have been to provide stop-gap measures until the Crimi-
nal Code was amended to include computer-related crimes, one
should be wary of decisions that go beyond the interpretative role of
the courts. Criminal laws are of the utmost importance in our soci-
ety. These laws address the more serious contraventions of the
rules of social behavior, and consequently they carry with them se-
vere penalties. The ultimate penalties that society may impose on
its members are found under criminal sanctions; the death penalty,
a social black-listing by way of criminal record and the deprivation
of an individual's freedom by way of incarceration are incorporated
into the criminal regime. With this in mind, it is imperative that the
process of composing and articulating criminal laws should remain
with the appropriate authority: the legislature. There is no room in
the criminal process for the subjective imposition of judge-made
law.
The issue as to whether confidential business information rep-
resents property for purposes of the Criminal Code was also ad!
dressed in the case of Regina v. Tannas, a 1984 decision of the
Court of Queens Bench of Alberta, Judicial District of Calgary.3 9
Tannas was a computer programmer hired by Dome Petroleum
Limited to develop computer programs to be used for Dome's data
processing operations. When he was hired, he signed an employee
agreement which stated that upon leaving the company, he might
be required to return all papers and documents relating to the com-
pany's business. During his employment, Tannas created a number
38. Id. at 224 (1984).
39. Regina v. Tannas, November 28, 1984, Court of Queen's Bench, Judicial District of
Calgary, per Bracco, J. See also, Hertz, Can a Computer Program Be Stolen?, 1 COMPUTER
LAW RPrR. No. 11, at 85-88 (November 1984).
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of specialized computer programs and supervised and assisted in the
development of many others.
When Tannas left Dome, he took with him computer tapes and
hard copies of more than one hundred of Dome's programs alleg-
edly worth between $250,000.00 and $360,000.00. 40 Many of the
programs taken by Tannas had been developed by him during his
employment, but some were programs in which he had no input
whatsoever. Tannas, when he left Dome, was not given an exit
interview.
The programmer was charged, pursuant to Section 283(l)(d) of
the Criminal Code,41 with theft of computer software. Specifically,
it was alleged that Tannas took the computer software with the in-
tent to destroy its confidentiality. In its arguments against Tannas,
the Crown relied heavily on the Stewart case to establish that confi-
dential information could be stolen.
In his case comment on the Tannas case, Allen Hertz states
that the judge instructed the jury as follows: ". . .[T]he courts have
had some difficulty deciding whether the information stored and
used in a computer is anything capable of being converted as con-
templated by the Criminal Code."'42 Hertz further points out that
the jurors were instructed by the judge that the term anything, as
set out in the Theft Section of the Criminal Code, includes: ". .. [A]
computer program; and the information contained in a computer
program. 43
Ultimately then, the issue for the jury was whether Tannas had
the requisite criminal intent to bring him under Section 283(1)(d).
That is, had Tannas: (a) acted fraudulently, without color of right;
and (b) had he converted Dome's programs with intent to deal with
them in such a manner that they could not be restored to the condi-
tion in which they had been at the time they were converted. The
40. Hertz, supra note 39, at 86 (1984).
41. Section 283(1) provides as follows:
Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right
takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the
use of another person, anything whether animate or inanimate, with intent,
(a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it or a person who has a
special property or interest in it, of the thing or of his property or interest in it,
(b) to pledge it or deposit it as security,
(c) to part with it under a condition with respect to its return that the person
who parts with it may be unable to perform, or
(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition
in which it was at the time it was taken or converted. § 283(1), CAN. REV.
STAT. ch. C-34 (1970).
42. Hertz, supra note 39, at 87 (1984).
43. Id.
1987]
COMPUTER & hGH-TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Crown was unable to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Tan-
nas had known that the programs were confidential. Further,
Dome had never asked Tannas for the return of any software he
may have copied. Thus the jury found Tannas not guilty.
In attempting to obtain a conviction against Tannas, the
Crown had also relied on the reasoning of R. v. Kirkwood in which
the owner of an electronics company was charged with and con-
victed of fraud under Section 338 of the Criminal Code." Kirk-
wood's company, Electronic Sight and Sound Centers Ltd.,
allegedly sold and rented video tapes, which Kirkwood knew had
been copied, without obtaining the copyright or distribution rights.
The company had created counterfeit tapes from legitimate tapes,
many of which had not yet been released to the public in video cas-
sette form. These tapes were made for sale in the company's outlets
along with legitimate tapes. In his decision, Lacourciere J.A.,
stated that:
It is conceded by the respondent that while there was no evi-
dence of "deceit" or "falsehood" in relation to the owners, there
was evidence to support a finding of dishonesty by "other fraudu-
lent means". In addition, the respondent conceded that the evi-
dence permits an inference to be drawn that the owners of the
copyright and distribution rights were actually or potentially de-
prived of revenues by the respondent's conduct.... Some form
of relationship or nexus between the perpetrator of the fraud and
its victim may be necessary in cases where the fraud has been
accomplished by deceit or falsehood. However, two essential ele-
ments of fraud are "dishonesty" and "deprivation", the latter ele-
ment being satisfied on proof of detriment, prejudice or risk of
prejudice to the economic interests of the victim.4 5
Finding against the defendant, the court referred to the 1978 case of
R. v. Clan, Hudson and Hartnett, a decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada, where the judges held that there need not be a nexus
between the person committing the fraud and the victim.4 6
The cases above demonstrate the fact that issues relating to
computer technology are causing a conceptual convergence of the
criminal law, intellectual and property law, and civil law.
One must query whether the criminal law is the appropriate
judicial vehicle to deal with certain aspects of computer-related
abuses or misappropriation of proprietary information. This issue is
44. 148 D.L.R.3d 323, 5 C.C.C.3d 393, 42 O.R.2d 65 (C.A.) (1983).
45. 148 D.L.R.3d at 327-328 (1983).
46. 2 S.C.R. 1175, 86 D.L.R.3d 212, 41 C.C.C.2d 145, 5 C.R.3d 1 (1978).
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particularly relevant when considering the apparent overlap of the
Copyright Act47 and the imposition of criminal sanctions relating to
proprietary rights in information as imposed by the Stewart and
Kirkwood cases. In his review of these two cases, Denis Magnus-
son, Dean, Faculty of Law, Queens University, commented:
Calls for new criminal sanctions have been made notwith-
standing the well-established civil remedies for infringement of
copyright (in respect of the type of infringement which occurred
in Kirkwood, see the Copyright Act, Section 17(4)) and for the
wrongful taking of confidential information or trade secrets.
48
Many would argue that the economic interests of the country as a
whole would be served better by the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions for infringement of copyright and the taking of confidential
information. However, it should be noted that the Copyright Act
presently imposes penal sanctions for infringement of copyright.
Unfortunately, the penalties have not been changed since the Act's
inception in 1924. Presently, the maximum monetary penalty
under the Act is a fine of $200.00 for a first offense.4 9
Was the Stewart decision needed to protect those who maintain
proprietary interests in information? According to R. Grant Ham-
mond, it was not.50 With reference to the Stewart case, Hammond
argues:
The decision is open to criticism on three major grounds. It is an
example of unwarranted judicial activism which is at odds with
certain law reform and parliamentary initiatives in Canada, the
technical handling of the authorities relied upon by the majority
judgments is suspect, and the practical consequences of the deci-
sion are far reaching and do not seem to have been adequately
addressed." 51
In his paper, Hammond was very critical of decisions such as Stew-
art where the judges have taken it upon themselves to reformulate
"...long standing, principled statutory policies without challenge or
,, 52debate".
It is interesting to note that at the time the Ontario Court of
Appeal was hearing the Stewart case, the Subcommittee on Com-
47. Copyright Act, CAN. REv. STAT. C-30 (1970).
48. Magnusson, Kirkwood and Stewart: Using the Criminal Law Against Infringement
of Copyright and the Taking of Confidential Information, 35 C.R.3d 129-134 (1983).
49. § 25 CAN. REV. STAT. C-30 (1970).
50. Hammond, Theft of Information, 100 LAw Q. REV. 252 (1984).
51. Id. at 253 (1984).
52. Id. at 262 (1984).
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puter Crime13 was concluding its deliberations on how the Cana-
dian Criminal Code should be amended in order to encompass the
problem of computer-related crime in Canada. The Subcommittee's
Report recommended that the Criminal Code definition of property
not be changed. 4
A 1986 decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta in R. v.
Offley reinforces the arguments against the reasoning in the Stewart
case." The facts in Offley were similar to those in Stewart. The
accused was a retired Royal Canadian Mounted Police staff ser-
geant who operated his own security company. His clients often
called upon him to do security checks to determine if job applicants
had criminal records.
To obtain information concerning the applicants, Offley re-
quested name checks to be done for him by the Edmonton City
Police Department through the Canadian Police Information
Center (CPIC), a national law enforcement data base system. He
was told that only law enforcement agencies were privy to such
records and his request was refused.
He then approached a constable of the Edmonton City Police
and offered to pay him $2.00 per name for each CPIC search. The
constable reported the incident to his superior and a plan was de-
vised to apprehend Offley. Upon receipt of money from the accused
in exchange for the CPIC name checks, Offley was arrested,
charged with and later convicted of theft of information, (property
of the City of Edmonton Police Department) and with counseling
with intent to procure or facilitate theft of information contrary to
Section 109(b) of the Criminal Code. 6
53. McManus, RCMP Specialists Probe the Crime No One Reports, Winnipeg Free
Press, April, 1981, at 2.
54. Report, supra note 18.
55. 45 Alta. 2d 23 (1986).
56. Section 109 states as follows:
109. Every one who
(a) being a justice, police commissioner, peace officer, public officer, or
officer of a juvenile court, or being employed in the administration of
criminal law, corruptly
(i) accepts or obtains,
(ii) agrees to accept, or
(iii) attempts to obtain, for himself or any other person any money,
valuable consideration, office, place or employment with intent
(iv) to interfere with the administration of justice,
(v) to procure or facilitate the commission of an offense, or
(vi) to protect from detection or punishment a person who has com-
mitted or who intends to commit an offense, or
(b) gives or offers, corruptly, to a person mentioned in paragraph (a)
any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment with
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Belzil, J.A. on behalf of the majority stated that the issue on
appeal was: "whether protected information is property capable of
being stolen."'5 7 After a full review and analysis of the reasoning in
Stewart, Bezil concluded: "With all respect I do not agree with the
majority decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Stewart.' '58
In reviewing the wording under Section 283 relating to theft,
Belzil found that:
What constitutes anything "animate or inanimate" in Section
283 must, in my view, be determined by the intrinsic nature of
the "thing" and not by its quality. If information per se is intrin-
sically incapable of being an "inanimate thing" the qualifying of
it as being "confidential" will not make it so...
Is the person who reveals a personal secret entrusted to him
by a friend to be guilty of theft? Or the person who reads a confi-
dential memo inadvertently left on his desk?59
The decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Offley con-
cluded that "confidential information is incapable of being
stolen.")60
Offley's appeal was allowed, the conviction of the trial court
was quashed and a verdict of acquittal was entered.
The cases of Stewart and Offley now represent juxtaposed inter-
pretations of the meaning of property under Section 283 of the
Criminal Code. Whether confidential information will be deemed
to be property for the purpose of that Section will be determined in
Stewart's appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. It is argued that
the decision in Stewart should be overturned in favor of a more re-
stricted and traditional interpretation of the property definition as
set out in the Offley case.
VI. "UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A COMPUTER SERVICE"-SECTION
301.2 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
The previous cases illustrate the confusion associated with
criminal prosecutions for computer based crimes. The 1985 amend-
ments attempt to clarify the confusion and provide a standard set of
rules for dealing with computer crimes.
intent that the person should do anything mentioned in subpara-
graph (a)(iv), (v) or (vi), is guilty of an indictable offense and is lia-
ble to imprisonment for fourteen years, 1953-54, c.51 s.101. § 109
CAN. REV. STATC-34 (1970).
57. 45 Alta. 2d 24 (1986).
58. Id. at 27.
59. Id.
60. 45 Alta. 2d 24, 29 (1986).
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The new Section 301.2 of the Criminal Code appears to be in
direct response to public protest and to the Supreme Court of Can-
ada's requirement in McLaughlin for a specific statutory prohibition
relating to the unauthorized access of computers.
The new subsection describing the offense of unauthorized use
of computer services reads as follows:
301.2(1)
Every one who, fraudulently and without color of right,
(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service,
(b) by means of an electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or
other device, intercepts or causes to be intercepted, directly or
indirectly, any function of a computer system, or
(c) uses or causes to be used, directly or indirectly, a computer
system with intent to commit an offense under paragraph (a) or
(b) or an offense under 387 in relation to data or a computer
system is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding ten years, or is guilty of an offense
punishable on summary conviction.
(2) In this section, "computer program" means data repre-
senting instructions or statements that, when executed in a com-
puter system, causes the computer system to perform a function;
"computer service" includes data processing and the storage or
retrieval of data;
"computer system" means a device that, or a group of intercon-
nected or related devices one or more of which,
(a) contains computer programs or other data, and
(b) pursuant to computer programs,
(i) performs logic and control, and
(ii) may perform any other function;
"data" means representations of information or of concepts that
are being prepared or have been prepared in a form suitable for
use in a computer system; "electromagnetic, acoustic, mechani-
cal or other device" means any device or apparatus that is used
or is capable of being used to intercept any function of a com-
puter system, but does not include a hearing aid used to correct
subnormal hearing of the user to not better than normal hearing;
"function" includes logic, control, arithmetic, deletion, storage
and retrieval and communication or telecommunication to, from
or within a computer system;
"intercept" includes listen to or record a function of a computer
system, or acquire the substance, meaning or purport thereof.
1985, c.19 s.46.61
Certainly, had Section 301.2(1) been in place when McLaugh-
61. § 301.2(1) CAN. REV. STAT. Ch. C-34 (1970) (amended 1985).
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lin was charged, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court of Can-
ada would have found him guilty of unauthorized use of a computer
service.
VII. "MISCHIEF "-SECTION 387(1.1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
A new offense for mischief in relation to data, Section 387(1.1),
has also been added. This section eliminates a gap in the criminal
law whereby law enforcement agencies were unable to prosecute
computer "hackers". The section reads as follows:
387(1.1) Every one commits mischief who wilfully
(a) destroys or alters data;
(b) renders data meaningless, useless or ineffective;
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person who
is entitled to access thereto.
62
It should be noted that Section 387(1.1), as amended, falls
under Part 9 of the Criminal Code ("Willful and Forbidden Acts in
Respect of Certain Property"). 63 Of special interest, is Section 385
in that Part which states: "Property means real or personal corpo-
real property (1983-84, C.51, S.370)." On the other hand, Section
283(1) of the Criminal Code defines theft as an act of fraudulently
and without colour of right, taking, or fraudulently and without
color of right converting to one's own use or to another's use,
"...anything whether animate or inanimate". 6 There is a clear
difference then, between the definition of what can be stolen, that is,
property, in Section 283(1) which falls under Part 7 of the Criminal
Code and property as set out in Section 385 under Part 9 of the
Criminal Code. In addition, the legislative draftsmen have specifi-
cally excluded data from being interpreted as "anything" under
Section 283.
There is no new amendment to Section 283(1) incorporating
the definition of data as set out in Section 301.2, which term is ap-
plicable in Section 387 under Bill C-18. The decision of the legisla-
tive draftsmen not to broaden the definition of property for the
purposes of the theft provisions in the Criminal Code was based on
the following reasoning:
For purposes of consistency in policy, misappropriation of
information from a computer system should not be a criminal
offense, if the same conduct in a non-computer environment is
62. § 387(1.1) CAN. REV. STAT. Ch C-34 (1970) (amended 1985).
63. Id. at § 387(1.1).
64. § 283(l) CAN. REv. STAT. Ch. C-34 (1970).
1987]
COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
not criminally culpable. In this regard, it should be noted that
Bill C-19 does not contain any provisions amending the defini-
tion of "property" so as to include "information" or "computer-
stored information" so that the existing theft and fraud provi-
sions of the Criminal Code might apply. The protection of com-
puterized information from misappropriation is to be achieved
via the offenses of, dishonestly and without a claim of right, (a)
obtaining a computer service, (b) intercepting a function of a
computer system and (c) using a computer system with the pre-
scribed mental intentions. Addressing the problem in this man-
ner avoids certain legal and socio-economic problems inherent in
ascribing proprietary rights to information and thereby attempt-
ing to apply the existing theft and fraud provisions.
65
VIII. THE COPYRIGHT ALTERNATIVE
In 1984, the White Paper on Copyright was published by the
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the Depart-
ment of Communications.6 6 In its analysis, the government recog-
nized that criminal sanctions were required to deter some forms of
copyright infringement. The White Paper proposed a section for
criminal offenses and sanctions as follows:
Criminal Offenses and Sanctions
Given the economic nature of copyright, civil remedies will
play the major role in copyright enforcement, for they are readily
available in most instances.
There are some cases where criminal sanctions are the more
appropriate instrument. Sometimes the magnitude of the in-
fringement makes it either too costly or too complex for a private
party to sue, or the socially reprehensible character of the con-
duct calls for public condemnation.
The current Act defines a number of separate and distinct
offenses. Apart from the addition of specific technologies not ex-
plicitly covered by these provisions, such as film and broadcast
performances, the existing offenses will be maintained.
However, the penalties will adequately reflect today's eco-
nomic circumstances. The maximum penalty for these offenses
will be a multiple of the value of the gross sales, the rental in-
come or the remaining inventory of the infringing material, or a
combination of these. The maximum fine for performances will
be a multiple of the proceeds of any sale of tickets for the per-
65. Piragoff, supra note 28, at 311.
66. CANADA, CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS, FROM GUTENBERG TO TE-
LIDON: A WHITE PAPER ON COPYRIGHT (Minister of Sup. and Serv. Can. 1984).
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formance. If the values cannot be estimated, the maximum fine
will be $25,000.
An indictable offense punishable by a fine, a jail sentence, or
both, will be created to deal with serious commercial infringe-
ments that include the following ingredients:
- Deliberate perpetration;
- commission for commercial benefit or by way of trade;
- without color of right;
- either a potential or actual benefit to the perpetrator exceed-
ing $5,000 or commission of the act knowing that it may prejudi-
cially affect in a serious way any person's copyright.
The fine will be established according to the rules mentioned
above. The maximum penalty for such offenses will be from two
to five years imprisonment in addition to or in lieu of the fine.
67
The remedy provisions of the proposed amendments to the
Copyright Act were designed to serve three main functions:
First, they provide restitution to copyright owners whose inter-
ests have been damaged by infringement. Second, injunctions
and orders to deliver infringing goods or plates can be used to
forestall potential infringements. Third, exemplary or punitive
damages can be used to punish repeated or flagrant infringers
and to serve as a warning to other would-be infringers.
5
The White Paper on Copyright faced considerable criticism for
certain of its recommendations, such as the proposal to limit the
protection of copyright for computer software to five years. The
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs has done a com-
mendable job in responding to those criticisms and has recently
published further revisions.6 9 Among other things, the new revi-
sions provide for a term of protection for computer programs equal
to the life of the author plus fifty years. Also, work created during
the course of employment will be deemed to be owned by the corpo-
rate entity or person for whom the work was created. Corporate
entities will be entitled to full rights of protection under the pro-
posed Act.
A Federal-Provincial study on the Protection of Trade Secrets
and Commercial Information was commenced in February, 1984.
This study is examining the possibility of drafting Trade Secret leg-
67. Id. at 71.
68. White Paper, supra note 66, at 68.
69. CANADA, CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS, A CHARTER OF RIGHTS FOR
CREATORS (Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1985) (report of the Subcommittee on
the revision of Copyright by the Standing Committee on Communications and Culture).
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islation which will afford protection for strategic business
information.
It is argued by many that the Copyright Act and other intellec-
tual property laws are more appropriate than the Criminal Code for
dealing with offenses relating to misappropriation of proprietary in-
formation. Contrary to the Stewart court, it is this author's belief
that in creating protection for confidential information, trade
secrets, computer programs, or any other form of proprietary infor-
mation, the Criminal Code should be the avenue of last resort.
IX. A COMPARISON OF RELEVANT CRIMINAL CODE AND
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTIONS
Contrary to the federal system in Canada, in the United States,
criminal sanctions for computer abuses are enacted on a state by
state basis. California was one of the first states to enact such laws
in large part due to the strong influence of the computer industry in
the state. As a leading jurisdiction, California's Penal Code Sec-
tions will be compared with the corresponding Canadian provisions
(see appendix).
California penalties for computer abuse are found in Section
502 of the Penal Code. Section 502(b) addresses the intentional ac-
cess of computers, and Section 301.2 of the Canadian Criminal
Code provides penalties for the unauthorized use of computers.
Section 502(b) is broader than Section 301.2. Section 301.2
only applies to the obtaining of computer services, the interception
of any function of a computer system or the use of a computer with
the intent to commit mischief. Conversely, Section 502(b) applies
to accessing a computer for the purpose of fraud or extortion or for
obtaining money, property or services.
Under the definitions clauses of the two sections it is notewor-
thy that Section 502 attempts to narrow the definition of computer
system by excluding nonprogrammable pocket calculators. The Ca-
nadian definition has no such exclusions. It is unclear why pocket
calculators in particular have been excluded under Section 502.
Would not the same reasoning apply to microwave ovens or similar
microchip devices? This is a further illustration of the definitional
problems inherent in defining current technology. Section 301.2 al-
lows for a defense relating to color of right where the accused can
show that he had an honest belief that he was legally justified in
doing the act.
The California Penal Code has specific sanctions for the theft
[Vol. 3
CANADL4N CRIMINAL CODE
of information.7" Under the definition of property, such things as
data, computer programs and other related documents have been
incorporated. As previously discussed, Section 301.2 of the Cana-
dian Criminal Code has no such provision.
An exception is made in Section 502(d) for employees acces-
sing their employer's computers if such access was within the scope
of employment. No such exception is made for Canadian employ-
ees under Section 301.2.
Section 502(c) of the California Penal Code parallels Canadian
Criminal Code Section 387(1.1) relating to mischief. Section 502(d)
addresses the malicious destruction or alteration of data. Under
Section 387(1.1), the accused need only have acted wilfully whereas
under Section 502(c), malicious intent is required. The objects of
the criminal acts described in Section 502(c) are computer systems,
computer networks, computer programs or data. The object of the
offense set out under Section 387(1.1) is data. Reference to mischief
against property is in Section 387(1) of the Criminal Code. "Data"
is not property for the purposes of Section 387(1.1).
Sections 301.2 and 387(1.1) of the Canadian Criminal Code
and Sections 502(e), (f), and (g) of the California Penal Code pro-
vide corresponding penalties upon conviction. Upon review of the
two schemes for punishment, it is apparent that the Canadian sanc-
tions are more severe. Even minor offenses under these sections
bring with them penalties of least five hundred dollars or incarcera-
tion for six months or more. However, the California Penal Code
punishments under Section 502 are more comprehensive. Viola-
tions are classified in accordance with the results of the criminal act
as described and differentiated in Sections 502(f)(1), (2) and (3).
California distinguishes between first offenses and second and subse-
quent offenses.
Section 502(g) provides for civil actions where a conviction is
obtained. Under Canadian Criminal law, such a reference to civil
actions is not within the jurisdictions of the federal government.
Property and civil rights are under the sole responsibility of the pro-
vincial governments pursuant to Section 92(13) of the Constitution
Act, 1982.
X. CONCLUSION
To date, the Canadian Courts have not been presented with a
case involving charges under either Section 301.2 or Section
70. Cal. Code Ann. § 502 (West Supp. 1986).
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387(1.1). The definitions set out in Section 301.2(2) will undoubt-
edly be challenged by defense counsel as confusing, unworkable and
inconsistent. Such definitions will become clarified as courts are
called upon to to decide which microchip devices should be in-
cluded or excluded under such definitions in order to avoid absurd
results such as prosecution for unauthorized use of a pocket
calculator.
The Supreme Court of Canada will decide whether confidential
information can be stolen when it hears the Stewart appeal. The
Court will have to determine whether the decision of the Ontario
High Court in Stewart which held that information is property
under the Criminal Code should prevail or whether the Offley deci-
sion which rejected the reasoning in Stewart provides a more rea-
sonable analysis of the intent of Section 283 relating to property. It
is argued here that the Offley case should prevail.
It is clear that current Copyright Act penal sanctions are out-
dated. However, the Department of Consumer and Corporate Af-
fairs and the Department of Communications are striving to create
a revised Copyright Act which will adequately address infringe-
ments of computer software. The revised Copyright Act will in-
clude specific criminal code sanctions as outlined in the White
Paper on Copyright.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Subcommittee on
Computer Crime, a Federal-Provincial study on the Protection of
Trade Secrets and Commercial Information was commenced and
will propose legislative protection for confidential information
which in turn will reduce the need for criminal sanctions.
Comprehensive, technology-oriented statutes should be devel-
oped in Canada which will afford protection for intellectual prop-
erty and which will include Criminal Code references for serious
violations that go beyond a prescribed criminal threshold. Restrict-
ing the Stewart case will enhance the establishment of suitable defi-
nitional parameters for computer terms defined in the Criminal
Code.
The Criminal Code differs from the California Penal Code in
its conceptual approach to computer abuses. In Canada, the defini-
tion of property has remained narrow in its scope and only relates
to anything whether animate or inanimate; it does not relate to in-
formation. In California, the Penal Code incorporates such con-
cepts as trade secrets, data and computer programs into the
definition of property. Furthermore, information is considered
property and can be stolen in California. Attorneys representing
[Vol. 3
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United States companies carrying on business in Canada, need to
recognize these fundamental differences when attempting to protect
the company's proprietary information and computer systems.
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APPENDIX
CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE AND CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE SECTIONS
CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE
Unauthorized use of computer:
301.2(1) Everyone who, fraudulently and
without color of right,
(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any com-
puter service,
(b) by means of an electromagnetic acoustic,
mechanical or other device, intercepts or
causes to be intercepted, directly or indi-
rectly, any function of a computer sys-
tem, or
(c) uses or causes to be used, directly or
indirectly, a computer system with
intent to commit an offense under para-
graph (a) or (b) or an offense under Sec-
tion 387 in relation to data or a
computer system.
DEFINITIONS
301(2) In this section, "computer program"
means data representing instructions or
statements that, when executed in a com-
puter system, causes the computer system to
perform a function:
"computer system" includes data processing
and the storage or retrieval of data; "com-
puter system" means a device that, or a
group of interconnected or related devices
one or more of which,
(a) contains computer programs or other
data, and
(b) pursuant to computer programs,
(i) performs logic and control, and
(ii) may perform any other
function;
"data" means representations of
information or of concepts that are
being prepared or have been pre-
pared in a computer system;
"electromagnetic, acoustic, mechan-
ical or other device" means any
device or apparatus that is used or is
capable of being used to intercept
any functions of a computer system,
but does not include a hearing aid
used to correct subnormal hearing of
the user to not better than normal
hearing;
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE
Intentional access of computer:
502(b) Any person who intentionally
accesses or causes to be accessed any com-
puter system or computer network for the
purpose of (1) devising or executing any
scheme or artifice to defraud or extort, or (2)
obtaining money, property, or services with
false or fraudulent intent, representations, or
promises, is guilty of a public offense.
502(d) Any person who intentionally and
without authorization accesses any com-
puter system, computer network, computer
program, or data, with knowledge that the
access was not authorized, shall be guilty of
a public offense. This subdivision shall not
apply to any person who accesses his or her
employer's computer system, computer net-
work, computer program, or data when act-
ing within the scope of his or her
employment.
DEFINITIONS
502(a) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Access" means to instruct, communi-
cate with, store data in, or retrieve data
from, a computer system or computer
network.
(2) "Computer System" means a device or
collection of devices, excluding pocket calcu-
lators which are not programmable and
capable of being used in conjunction with
external files, one or more of which contain
computer programs and data, that perform
functions, including, but not limited to logic,
arithmetic, data storage and retrieval, com-
munication and control.
(3) "Computer network" means an inter-
connection of two or more computer
systems.
(4) "Computer program" means an ordered
set of instructions or statements, and related
data that, when automatically executed in
actual or modified form in a computer sys-
tem, causes it to perform specified functions.
(5) "Data" means a representation of infor-
mation, knowledge, facts, concepts, or
instructions, which are being prepared or
have been prepared, in a formalized manner,
and are intended for use in a computer sys-
tem or computer network.
(6) "Financial instrument" includes, but is
CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE
"functions" includes logic, control,
arithmetic, deletion, storage and
retrieval and communication or tele-
communication to, from or within a
computer system;
"intercept" includes listen to or rec-
ord a function of a computer system,
or acquire the substance, meaning or
purport thereof.
MISCHIEF:
387(l.1) Everyone commits mis-
chief who wilfully
(a) destroys or alters data;
(b) renders data meaningless, use-
less or
ineffective;
(c) obstructs, interrupts or inter-
feres with
the lawful use of data; or
(d) obstructs, interrupts or inter-
feres with any person in the law-
ful use of data or denies access
to data to any person who is
entitled to access thereto.
SANCTIONS:
301.2(l)(c) imprisonment for a term
not exceeding ten years, or is guilty
of an offense punishable on sum-
mary conviction. Summary convic-
tions punishment is set out under
Section 722(l) of the Criminal Code
and refers to a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars or to imprison-
ment for six months or more.
387(1.1) imprisonment for a term
not exceeding ten years; or... pun-
ishable on summary conviction.
not limited to, any check, draft, warrant,
money order, note, certificate of deposit, let-
ter of credit, bill of exchange, credit or debit
card, transaction authorization mechanism,
marketable security, or any computer system
representation thereof.
(7) "Property" includes, but is not limited
to, financial instruments, data, computer
programs, documents associated with com-
puter systems and computer programs, or
copies thereof, whether tangible or intangi-
ble, including both human and computer
system readable data, and data while in
transit.
(8) "Services" includes, but is not limited to,
the use of the computer system, computer
network, computer programs, or data pre-
pared for computer use, or data contained
within a computer system, or data contained
within a computer network.
MALICIOUS DEsTmUcIoNS OR
ALTERATION OF DATA:
502(c) Any person who maliciously
accesses, alters, deletes, damages, destroys or
disrupts the operation of any computer sys-
tem, computer network, computer program,
or data is guilty of a public offense.
SANCTIONS:
502(e) Any person who violates any provi-
sion of subdivision (b) or (c) unless specified,
is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprison-
ment in the state prison for 16 months, or
two or three years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, or by a fine not exceeding five
thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprison-
ment in the county jail not exceeding one
year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(f)(1) A first violation of subdivision (d)
which does not result in injury is an infrac-
tion punishable by a fine not exceeding two
hundred fifty dollars ($250).
(2) A violation of subdivision (d) which
results in an injury, or second or subsequent
violation of subdivision (d) with no injury, is
a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or
by imprisonment in the county jail not
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exceeding one year, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
(3) As used in this subdivision,
"injury" means any alteration, deletion,
damage, or destruction of a computer sys-
tem, computer network, computer program,
or data caused by the access, or any expendi-
ture reasonably and necessarily incurred by
the owner or lessee to verify that a computer
system, computer network, computer pro-
gram, or data was not altered, deleted, dam-
aged, or destroyed by the access.
(g) In addition to any other civil remedy
available, the owner or lessee of the com-
puter system, computer network, computer
program, or data may bring a civil action
against any person convicted under this sec-
tion for compensatory damages, including
any expenditure reasonably and necessarily
incurred by the owner or lessee to verify that
a computer system, computer network, com-
puter program, or data was not altered,
damaged, or deleted by the access. For the
purposes of actions authorized by this subdi-
vision, the conduct of an unemancipated
minor shall be imputed to the parent or legal
guardian having control or custody of the
minor, pursuant to the provisions of Sections
1714.1 of the Civil Code.
